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2Abstract
The emerging world crisis created by declining fish stocks poses a challenge to resource 
users and managers. The problem is particularly acute in poor nations, such as those in 
East Africa, where fishing is an important subsistence activity but high fishing intensity 
and use of destructive gear have resulted in declining catches. In this context, developing 
effective management strategies requires an understanding of how fishers may respond to 
declines in catch. We examined the readiness of 141 Kenyan fishers to stop fishing under 
hypothetical scenarios of declines in catch and how socioeconomic conditions influenced 
their decisions. As expected, the proportion of fishers that would exit the fishery 
increased with magnitude of decline in catch. Fishers were more likely to say they would 
stop fishing if they were from households that had a higher material style of life and a 
greater number of occupations. Variables such as capital investment in the fishery and the 
proportion of catch sold had weak, nonsignificant relationships. Our finding that fishers 
from poorer households would be less likely to exit a severely declining fishery are 
consistent with the literature on poverty traps, which suggests the poor are unable to 
mobilize the necessary resources to overcome either shocks or chronic low-income 
situations and consequently may remain in poverty.  This finding supports the proposition 
that wealth generation and employment opportunities directed at the poorest fishers may 
help reduce fishing effort on overexploited fisheries, but successful interventions such as 
these will require an understanding of the socioeconomic context in which fishers 
operate.
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3Introduction 
Many of the world’s fisheries are being overfished, which has lead to declines in 
productivity and catch (Pauly et al. 2002). This trend is, however, masked or confounded 
by natural variability in fish populations that make it a challenge to separate the 
environmental and population noise from the effects of excessive fishing effort (Ludwig 
et al. 1993; Hilborn 2007). Fishers are aware of fluctuations in catch and may not be able 
to distinguish short-term variation from long-term trends in stock abundance due to 
overexploitation (van Densen 2001). Fishers have developed a range of strategies and 
responses to deal with fluctuations in catch (Allison & Ellis 2001). The general response 
options to fishers faced with a decline in yield are to suffer losses in catch; temporarily 
switch to alternative occupations in hopes that catches will improve later; leave the 
fishery; or attempt to mask declining stocks with increases in effort, changing fishing 
grounds, or changing to alternate and usually more efficient or destructive gear (Pauly 
1990; McClanahan et al. 2005).
The readiness of fishers to choose one of these options affects fish stocks and compliance 
with management interventions that aim to decrease fishing pressure. Regardless, many 
marine-reserve and fishery-management decisions ignore fishers’ responses to 
management (Wilen et al. 2002), sometimes with disastrous consequences (McClanahan 
2007). For example, most marine-reserve plans assume fishing effort displaced by 
management either disappears or is reallocated in the larger economy (Wilen et al. 2002). 
In reality, human effort may be displaced into the larger fishery, particularly when fishing 
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4skills and aptitude are present and where poverty and education limit the options to enter 
the larger economy. A range of factors may influence whether or how fishers reallocate 
their effort, including investments in the fishery, ownership or tenure, market factors 
(e.g., price and distance to market), and conditions of the wider economy (e.g., Allison & 
Ellis 2001; Wilen et al. 2002; Stewart et al. 2006). Understanding the conditions that 
make fishers choose a particular option is crucial to developing management policies 
with high compliance and success.
Early work on fisheries decision making assumed that in open-access systems fishers 
respond to profitability, entering and exiting the fishery in response to the balance of 
revenue and costs, including the opportunity costs created by other options (Wilen 1976, 
2004; Bjorndal & Conrad 1987). This lead to the understanding of fishing effort in terms 
of bioeconomic equilibrium, where fishers exit the fishery when yields drop below a cost-
effective or management-imposed threshold (Clark 1985; Allison & Ellis 2001; 
Beddington et al. 2007).  In many poor countries the low opportunity cost experienced by 
poor fishers in the context of an excess labor force and the limited costs of entering the 
fishery is assumed to lead to a bioeconomic equilibrium in which the fishery is heavily 
overexploited (McManus 1997). However, such broad-scale analyses ignore the 
considerable heterogeneity that characterizes fishers’ behavior (Wilen 2004). 
Recently researchers have attempted to incorporate this heterogeneity by modeling 
individual, vessel, and firm-level responses to different conditions to identify individuals 
that may be displaced by management interventions and how they may reallocate their 
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5effort (Holland 2002; Brandt 2007).To date, our understanding of how fishers decide to 
enter or exit a fishery is based almost entirely on commercial fisheries in developed 
countries (e.g., Pradhan & Leung 2004; Stewart et al. 2006; Brandt 2007). Few 
researchers have explored these issues in artisanal or primarily subsistence coral-reef 
fisheries (Sievanen et al. 2005), which are responsible for providing income and 
subsistence livelihoods to millions of people (Castilla & Defeo 2005). We interviewed 
Kenyan fishers to explore their socioeconomic characteristics and their willingness to exit 
the fishery given hypothetical declines in catch. We then examined the relationship 
between the probability of fishers remaining in the fishery and their socioeconomic 
characteristics.
Methods
Sampling
We studied 9 coastal communities along the Kenyan coast between Mombasa and 
Malindi: Bamburi (Jomo Kenyatta public beach), Utange, Vipingo, Kuruwitu, Vuma, 
Takaungu, Mayungu, Shela, and Mijikenda. A combination of systematic household 
surveys; semistructured interviews with key informants (community leaders and resource 
users); participant observations; descriptions of daily and seasonal time use, and analyses 
of secondary sources, such as population censuses and fisheries records, were used to 
gather information and triangulate results. We surveyed 434 households, from which 
there were 141 fishers.  
We sampled a fraction of every ith household , the fraction of which was determined by 
dividing the total village population by the sample size (Henry 1990). We interviewed the 
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6head of the household or if unavailable another adult from the household. The number of 
surveys per community ranged from 29-87, depending largely on the population of the 
village and the available time per site. Time per site was influenced by factors such as 
weather and the availability or frequency of transportation to certain sites. In Bamburi 
and Utange, where the density of fishing households was low, we supplemented our 
sample with fisher interviews at the landing site. These fishers were randomly selected 
from lists of active fishers provided by local fisheries representatives.
Socioeconomic indicators
We examined 10 socioeconomic indicators that we hypothesized could be related to 
decision by fishers to enter or exit a fishery:  material style of life; fortnightly expenditure 
per household member; whether expensive equipment (e.g., a net or boat) was owned; 
age; years of education; proportion of catch bartered or sold; catch rate; occupational 
diversity; household occupational multiplicity; and whether fishing was the household’s 
primary occupation (Ikiara & Odink 2000; Allison & Ellis 2001; Pollnac et al 2001; 
Stewart et al. 2006; Brandt 2007). In developing countries, material style of life can be an 
indicator of relative wealth or social status within a community (Pollnac & Crawford 
2000). Material style of life measures wealth on the basis of household possessions or 
structure. We examined the type of walls, roof, and floor in respondents’ houses and 
inquired whether they had a radio and access to a toilet. We calculated a wealth score for 
each household in the survey (n = 432) by running a factor analysis with a varimax 
rotation on the presence or absence of these items in their household. Interviewees also 
estimated their household’s total fortnightly expenditure, and we divided this number by 
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7the number of householders to provide a further indication of wealth that accounted for 
household size.
We examined the occupational portfolio of households by asking respondents to describe 
all activities that brought food or money into the household and to rank them in order of 
importance to determine whether fishing was ranked as their primary occupation or not. 
Occupational diversity was defined as the number of different types of occupations (e.g., 
fishing, agriculture, informal economy sectors).  Occupational multiplicity was defined as 
the sum of the number of occupations held by all household members. Occupational 
multiplicity was log transformed to reduce the effect of outlying values and reflect the 
greater importance of each additional occupation if households had fewer occupations.
We asked fishers about the type of gear they owned and the proportion of their catch they 
sold. We also asked fishers to report their catch on a good, bad, and normal day. For data 
analysis, normal catches were log transformed to normalize the data and reduce the effect 
of outliers. We used the normal-day figure to construct hypothetical scenarios involving a 
reduction of catch. Fishers were asked what they would do in response to a sustained 
decline in their normal catch of 10 %, 20 %, 30 %, and 50 %.  Responses were recorded 
as either continue fishing as now, adapt in some way (moving location, changing gear or 
increasing effort), or stop fishing. 
We also examined labor flows between the fishery and other occupations by asking all 
interviewees whether they had changed occupation within the last 5 years and if they had 
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8why they changed and whether they preferred their former or current employment. 
Responses were grouped into categories according to reasons for changing occupation. 
This provided information on the reasons for entry (interviews with current fishers that 
entered the fishery in the past 5 years, n = 45) and exit (interviews with householders that 
formerly had fishers, n = 18) from the fishery. 
Analyses
We fitted a binary logistic-regression model to predict the probability of fishers saying 
they would exit in response to a 50 % decline on the basis of socioeconomic variables. 
We used a stepwise model selection procedure in R (function “step”, direction = “both”, 
n = 120 because of missing values in some variables), which added and removed each of 
the 10 explanatory variables in turn to select a model with the optimal fit to the data on 
the basis of Akaike information criterion (AIC). Following the selection procedure, 
nested F tests were used to remove a single remaining term, which was still insignificant. 
The selected variables had no missing values, so the final model was fitted to the full 
sample of 141. 
Results
Principle component analysis of material style of life items resulted in a single factor that 
explained 57 % of the variance (the factor loadings for each item are listed in Table 1). 
Material style of life scores for fisher households ranged from -1 to 1.73 (mean [SD] = -
0.25 [SD 0.899]). Fortnightly expenditure ranged from US$0.9 -91.3 (mean [SD] = $13.1 
[SD 13.2]).  Occupational diversity ranged from 1 to 3 occupational categories per 
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9household (mean [SD] = 1.3 [SD 0.5]). Occupational multiplicity ranged from 1-16 
person-jobs per household with a mean of 2.7 (SD 2.2). The normal catch ranged from 1 
kg to 100 kg per fisher, with a mean of 8.7 (SD 14.2). Fishers sold 34-100% of their catch 
(mean =  88 %, SD = 14.4). Only 21% of fishers owned fishing gear that required a 
considerable capital investment, such as a net or boat. The age of respondents ranged 
between 15-85 with a mean of 37 years (SD 15.2).
The proportion of fishers that would stop fishing increased with the severity of the 
hypothetical decline in catch, from <5 % of fishers who claimed they would stop fishing 
in response to a 10 % decline to 44 % of fishers who would stop in response to a 50 % 
decline (Fig. 1). The proportion of fishers that would adapt their fishing practices (e.g., 
fishing harder, changing gear) remained relatively constant throughout the different 
scenarios, fluctuating by only about 8 % (Fig. 1).
In determining whether household variables were related to fishers’ decisions to remain 
in or exit the fishery, the stepwise process removed the following variables due to weak, 
nonsignificant relationships: fortnightly expenditure per head, age, education, proportion 
of fish sold, normal catch rate, fishing as a primary occupation, and capital investment in 
the fishery. Occupational diversity was selected by the AIC process, but the effect was 
insignificant, so we removed it from the model. This left 2 variables related to the odds of 
exiting the fishery: the number of occupations (B = 1.92, SE = 0.68, Z = 5.95, p = 0.005) 
and wealth (B = 0.49, SE = 0.21, Z = 2.37, p = 0.018). The likelihood of exiting the 
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fishery in response to a 50 % decline in catch increased with wealth and the number of 
occupations per household (Fig. 2). 
The majority of fishers who had recently changed occupation (53 %) mentioned that they 
were driven into the fishery by external circumstances (lost opportunities in previous 
occupations, age or health, or changes in legislation) (Fig. 3a). However, 38 % were 
attracted into the fishery by the opportunities provided in the fishery (e.g., income). 
Approximately 70 % of fishers mentioned that they could go back to their previous 
occupation if they desired, and 58 % preferred fishing to their previous occupation.
Former fishers suggested they were primarily driven out of the fishery by factors such as 
age or health (44 %), a lack of income from fishing (17 %), and changes in legislation (17 
%) (Fig. 3b). Only 11% of former fishers said they left fishing because they were 
attracted to other opportunities. The majority of former fishers (61 %) preferred fishing to 
their current occupation.
Discussion
In coastal and other parts of Kenya, resource extraction is closely tied to the informal 
economy, with considerable flows of labor between the 2 sectors (Okwi et al. 2007).
Despite a modest number of livelihood alternatives, the majority of current and former 
fishers preferred fishing to these alternative occupations. Thus, in Kenya, fishing is 
perceived as an attractive livelihood option. These findings are consistent with results 
from other studies of job satisfaction among artisanal fishers that show income and 
nonincome factors contribute to high levels of job satisfaction with fishing (e.g., Pollnac 
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et al. 2001, 2008; Pollnac & Poggie 2006). Consequently, fishing is a choice, not purely a 
necessity, and must be viewed in this context when considering the person’s motivations 
and decisions to enter or exit. 
When faced with hypothetical scenarios of declining catch, nearly half the fishers would 
exit the fishery if daily catch rates dropped 50 % . Of those that would stay in the fishery, 
approximately 20 % would alter their fishing practices by changing locations or gear and 
10% would fish harder. Although these results reflect responses to hypothetical changes, 
evidence of fishers exiting fisheries in Kenya can be seen due to the establishment of a 
fishery closure (McClanahan & Mangi 2000). The establishment of the closed area and 
changes to its size over time provided an opportunity to examine how fishers left and 
entered the fishery depending on size of the closed area. Fishers generally maintain a 
density of ~13 fishers/km2 in the fishing ground adjacent to the closure (McClanahan & 
Mangi 2000).  Furthermore, fishers’ responses were often fast. They even responded to a 
short-term increase in catch that lasted <4 months after a previously closed areas was 
open to fishing (McClanahan & Mangi 2000).
The role of poverty in fisheries has been explored from a number of perspectives (Bene 
2003). There are 2 main explanations for the role of poverty in many small-scale fishing 
communities: exogenous origin of poverty in the fishery, in which poverty arises from a 
lack of alternatives outside the fishery sector and endogenous origin of poverty in the 
fishery, in which resource overexploitation leads to poverty in the fishing sector (Gordon 
1954; Hardin 1968, Bene 2003). Our results suggest that both of these factors may play a 
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role in how fishers respond to fluctuations in the fishery. In particular, the respondents 
who were most inclined to remain in a declining fishery were those restricted by a lack of 
alternative occupations and poverty.
The role of occupational multiplicity in our study is largely consistent with a study of 
entry and exit from the Lake Victoria fishery in Kenya (Ikiara & Odink 2000), which 
reported that fishers in the declining Lake Victoria fishery “are in their current enterprise 
not because it is more profitable or yields higher utility relative to alternatives, but 
because alternatives are lacking.” However, our results are difficult to compare directly 
with many of the other studies on entry and exit from marine fisheries because these 
other studies are on commercial fisheries in developed countries with dramatically 
different economic conditions and property rights structures (e.g., Ward & Sutinen 1994; 
Pradhan & Leung 2004; Brandt 2007). For example, our results contrast with Stewart et 
al. (2006), who found that fishers who exited the New Zealand fishery typically had no 
other paid work apart from fishing. However, the context of these 2 studies is 
dramatically different: the basis of the New Zealand fishery was an individual 
transferable quota system in which those exiting the fishery were compensated by selling 
their quota. Furthermore, we based our study on responses to hypothetical scenarios.
Ours is the first study to explicitly examine links between poverty and decisions to exit a 
fishery. Our findings that fishers from poorer households are less likely to exit a severely 
declining fishery are consistent with the body of literature on “poverty traps” (e.g., 
Dasgupta 1997; Adato et al. 2006; Carter & Barrett 2006). Poverty traps are situations in 
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which poor people are unable to mobilize the necessary resources to overcome either 
shocks or chronic low-income situations and consequently remain in poverty.  Generally, 
the poor are excluded from higher-return livelihood strategies because of constraints on 
cash liquidity, a lack of access to credit, and social exclusion (Dasgupta 1997; Adato et 
al. 2006; Barrett et al. 2006). Consequently, to protect scarce but crucial productive 
assets, those in poor households are generally forced to choose lower-return strategies- 
even ones with continually declining returns (Dasgupta 1997; Barrett et al. 2006). 
Poverty traps can also be reinforced because the poor are unable to take risks equivalent 
to the wealthy (Barrett et al. 2006). For example, results of a study of poverty traps in 
rural Kenya and Madagascar showed that poor households pursued less risky livelihood 
strategies than wealthy households (Barrett et al. 2006).
Social traps, such as poverty traps, are difficult to escape for a variety of reasons. In some 
instances, short-term individual gains may appear to outweigh the sacrifices required to 
escape. There are 4 broad methods by which social traps can be escaped: education, 
insurance, superordinate authority (legal systems, government, religions), and creating 
incentives that convert traps to tradeoffs (Costanza 1987).  The poverty trap is different 
from other types of social traps because people can remain trapped by their specific social 
conditions, despite the presence of the aforementioned escape mechanisms. There are 2 
main options for escaping poverty traps: slowly building assets so that individuals reach 
the threshold level of output required to escape the poverty trap; and providing a “big 
push” or “positive shock” to the system through mechanisms such as policies or aid 
(Bloom et al. 2003). 
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Escaping the poverty trap in the Kenyan artisanal coral reef fishery will require that 
fishers who are already entrenched in the poverty trap and those near the threshold are 
targeted for assistance such as poverty reduction and alternative livelihood opportunities 
(perhaps including gear-exchanges for those practicing illegal and destructive techniques 
such as beach seine nets) (McClanahan et al. 2005). However, such development 
interventions often result in disappointing or even perverse outcomes if they do not 
adequately consider the socioeconomic context in which fishers operate (e.g. Pollnac et 
al. 2001, Allison & Ellis 2001). For example, alternative occupation projects for fishers 
are likely to fail of they can not provide the noneconomic aspects of job satisfaction that 
fishing does (Pollnac et al. 2001, 2008; Pollnac & Poggie 2006).  Additionally, in places 
such as Kenya, where the costs of entering the fishery are low, significantly raising the 
wealth of fishers in isolation of other economic sectors may attract new fishers, 
ultimately increasing harvesting pressure (Allison & Ellis 2001). Our results illustrate the 
critical importance of understanding the socioeconomic context of artisanal fisheries for 
their management.  
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Table1. Factor loadings used to calculate material style of life in nine Kenyan 
communities.   
 Material 
item Factor loadings 
Stone or
concrete wall 0.899
Dirt wall -0.886
Dirt floor -0.882
Cement floor 0.877
Thatch roof -0.799
Metal or 
cement roof 0.795
Toilet 0.310
Radio 0.266
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 Figure Legends. 
Figure 1. Fishers’ responses to 4 hypothetical scenarios of declining catch rates (10%, 
20%, 30%, and 50%). Fishers’ responses include continue fishing (continue), exit the 
fishery (exit), and adapt their fishing practices (adapt). The adapt category includes 
responses such as fish harder, reduce effort, change gear, and change location.
Figure 2. Probability of exiting the fishery at a 50% decline in catch as a function of 
occupational multiplicity and household wealth.  Responses are plotted as dots and 
shaded according to person’s relative wealth. Fitted probability lines show that the 
likelihood of exiting the fishery increases with occupational multiplicity (i.e., number of 
household occupations) and wealth (shaded white for poor households, grey for moderate 
households, and black for wealthy households).
Figure 3. Reasons respondents gave for why (a) current fishers that entered the fishery in 
the past five years started fishing, and (b) former fishers (within last 5 years) left the 
fishery.  White bars are positive response categories; respondents were either drawn into 
the fishery because of the opportunities it provided or left the fishery because of better 
opportunities provided elsewhere. Grey bars are negative response categories; respondent 
was forced into or out of the fishery.  
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